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T A X A T IO N  I N  E A R L Y  R E P U B L IC A N  P E R U , 1821-1851: 
P o licy  M a k in g  B e tw e e n  R e fo rm  a n d  T ra d itio n
N ils  J a c o b s e n
El estado no es rico porque tenga mas o menos rentas; eslo sí por la 
sagaz economía de manejarlas. De manera que las salidas del haber 
no sobrepujen a las entradas (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1822).
No somos ricos, ni como podem os serlo en esta inmensa soledad? 
Como podem os serlo en un país sin caminos, con escasas comunica­
ciones, sin comercio interno, y de consiguiente sin agricultura, sin 
movilidad que la promueva, y estando la poca con que se cuenta 
paralizada por reglamentos destructores, restos de nuestra antigua 
servidumbre (Anonymus [Santiago Tavara y Andrade] 1831)?
I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
“La falta absoluta de orden y de economía, acaso la mala versación y tam ­
bién la impericia de algunos funcionarios habían reducido el erario a una 
com pleta nulidad. N o solo se hallaba exhausto de fondos y recursos, sino 
que hasta habia perdido enteram ente su crédito” (Memoria de Hacienda, 
Perú 1829b: 5). W ith these w ords Peru’s M inister o f  Finance Lorenzo 
Bazo characterized in 1829 the fiscal adm inistration o f  the preceding 
governm ent. It is an indictm ent which was repeated again and again by 
nearly all contem porary observers o f the young republic’s finances 
during the first three decades o f Independence and is echoed by the 
scarce handful o f  m odern scholars w ho have shown any in terest in the 
subject.1 In this comunis opinio, then, the public finances o f Peru between 
1821 and the late 1840s were characterized by penury, disorganization and 
corruption, and such a state o f affairs was to  be blamed overwhelmingly 
on the chaos o f  the Wars o f Independence and the subsequent military 
caudillo politics.
It would be difficult to reject this gloom y picture completely. N everthe­
less, I shall a ttem pt to  show  in this paper that in som e regards Peru’s
1 See, for example, Basadre (1968-70,11:137); Rivera Serna (1959:410-411); McQueen 
(1926: 3-4); for an examplary analysis o f shifts in government revenue and spen­
ding of Latin American state during the early republican period see Halperin 
Donghi (1982).
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post-independence public finances perform ed better than assumed and 
that the causes for particular fiscal problem s which w ithout doubt p er­
sisted even throughout the era o f  the guano bonanza, were m ore com ­
plex than m ere adm inistrative inability and political disorder. We shall 
argue, that revenue collection recovered relatively fast after the end of 
the Wars o f Independence and that som e elem ents o f a reasonable taxa­
tion policy were com m on to m ost governm ents o f  that period. O n the 
other hand, the major fiscal problem s arose out o f  an uncontrolled p ro ­
cess o f  public expenditures. I will try to dem onstrate that the overall fis­
cal structure o f post-independence Peru was shaped as much by financial 
traditions from the late colonial period, the econom ic conditions o f the 
young nation, and conscious fiscal policies, as it was by the interminable 
political struggles between contending caudillos and their retinue.
II. TH E SIZE OF GROSS REVENUE
W hen  H ipólito U nanue became Peru’s first republican M inister o f  Fi­
nance under San M artin’s Protectorate in August 1821, he did not inherit a 
flourishing treasury. Annual revenue had been growing during the 1780s 
and early 1790s by about 20 to 30 percent. But from the late 1790s to 1812 
income stagnated at a level o f  between 4,600,000 and 3,200,000 pesos. 
The following years brought a dramatic slide in revenue collection to 
about 2,600,000 pesos (n e t)  in 1814, the consequence o f  war, disruption 
o f  shipping and tax reforms o f the Cortes at Cádiz. Viceroys Abascal and 
Pezuela struggled to stem  the tide through a massive emergency tax p ro ­
gram in 1815 and loans from the Consulado, o ther ramos ajenos, as well as 
the general population. D uring the following years m ore revenues were 
collected again — about 3,500,000 pesos in 1817 —, but the viceregal trea­
sury never recovered the relatively high level o f the first decade o f the 
n ineteenth century. Thus in the years since 1812 the colonial Peruvian 
financial situation had been catastrophic. But even before, since the re­
newal o f war against England in 1796, Peruvian finances were precariously 
weak with deficits accruing w henever the wars disrupted shipping and 
mercury supplies and dem ands for funds from Madrid became stronger 
(A nna 1979: 16,109-124; Fisher 1970: 119-123).
D uring the first four years o f its existence the Peruvian republican gov­
ernm ent adm inistered a war econom y with exceedingly tenuous control 
over the m inor part o f the national territory. This was reflected both  in 
the quantity and in the com position o f the collected revenues. Between
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August 1821 and August 1822 Unanue managed to scrape together som e
1,3000,000 pesos in regular income and about as much again through 
loans, secuestrations and the issue o f  paper m oney.2 A lthough we do not 
possess any global data for the remaining war years, things did not get 
much better until Ayacucho, while the m ining areas continued under 
control o f  the royalists, and San M artin’s early decrees abolishing tributo 
and the extraordinary taxes levied since 1812 rem ained in force.
Inspite o f  continuing complaints by governm ent officials about the lack 
o f  funds, recovery after the end o f the Wars o f Independence and the 
enactm ent o f a program  o f direct taxation during Bolivar’s adm inistra­
tion, was surprisingly swift. José de Morales y Ugalde, Finance M inister 
under President La Mar, reported  total revenues o f about 5,858,000 pesos 
for 1826, m ore than was ever taken in by the viceregal treasury. For 1827 he 
estim ated revenues o f about 5,200,000 pesos {Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 
1827: 47-51).
T he scanty data available for the quarter century after Ayacucho allow the 
tentative affirmation that total governm ent revenue continued to hover 
around values betw een 4,500,000 and just over 6,000,000 pesos. In other 
words, revenue stayed essentially stationary w ith short-term  fluctuations 
o f  an am plitude o f  approxim ately 25 percent. Only during the last six 
years under consideration here, the years o f Ramón Castilla’s first presi­
dency betw een 1846 and 1851, which also w itnessed a m arked intensifica­
tion in the political debate o f public finances, did governm ent revenue 
increase m odestly to  levels persistently above 6,000,000 pesos. But these 
increases were dwarfed when com pared to  the deluge o f advances on 
guano consignm ents, which lead to  national revenues o f about 
20,000,000 pesos only ten years later. In o ther words, nominally the 
annual revenues o f the Peruvian republic continued after the end o f the 
Independence Wars as high or, for som e years, even slightly higher than 
those o f  the viceroyalty during those years w hen the Bourbon reforms 
brought about the highest fiscal returns at least since the halcyon days of 
the early seventeenth century. At a first glance, then it would seem 
w rong, from  the p o in t o f view o f revenue collection, to  speak o f  a critical 
fiscal condition for Peru during the post-independence decades. 
Several strong caveats have to be kept in m ind in evaluating this som e­
2 Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1822:11-13); for the first six m onths o f 1822 total reve­
nue o f the tesorería general in Lima both from regular and extraordinary sources 
amounted to 1,658,117pesos and 6 reales; see Dancuart and Rodriguez (1902-26,1: 
235).
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w hat surprising statem ent. They concern the reliability o f  the data, the 
rate o f  inflation and the size o f  Peru’s population. The figures published 
in contem porary reports on Peru’s public finances are extremely confus­
ing, since under the same heading sums o f  greatly differing m eaning are 
listed. Thus a figure purporting to represent gross revenue may refer to 
the total am ount due (rather than collected); it may only represent the 
receipts in Lima’s tesorería general (excluding all funds spent directly in the 
departm ental treasuries); it may only be net revenue (total revenue 
m inus the costs o f  collection); or it may exclude back taxes collected dur­
ing the current year. W herever possible, I have attem pted to  base my 
analysis only on gross revenue actually collected, including back taxes 
and all departm ental receipts, w ithout deducting the cost o f collection 
(m ostly the salaries o f Ministry o f  Finance em ployees). Much o f  the vary­
ing figures on fiscal returns found in the literature can be attributed to 
this problem .
To my knowledge there exists as yet no long-term  price index for Peru 
covering the first half o f the n ineteenth century. Marcel Haitin has 
recently show n that the price o f seven agricultural com m odities in Lima 
rose at a mean annual rate o f  0.23 percent between 1799 and 1819.The war 
years between 1820 and 1823 show ed stronger price increases o f up to 11 
percent per annum , but in the following years prices declined again to  the 
level o f  1819 (Haitin 1985: 190-198). For the twenty-five years following 
the Wars o f  Independence circumstantial evidence would suggest rela­
tive price stability, punctured only during the period o f im port p rohibi­
tions for major food and non-food com m odities produced in Peru (m ost 
im portantly wheat, flour and cheap cottons) between 1828 and 1833 and 
again since the late 1840s, a period which saw the gradual beginning of 
the major price rises during the 1850s and 1860s, caused both  by the 
guano boom  and price increases for Peru’s agricultural exports in Europe 
(Macera 1974: CXXVI-CXXVIII; G ootenberg  1982: 348). Let us assume, 
for the sake o f  argum ent, price rises o f  between 20 and 30 percent for the 
period between the second decade o f  the n ineteenth century and 1850. 
This would signify gross revenue o f at least 4.2 million pesos annually 
during the late 1840s in constant terms o f  about 1810, about 19 percent 
less than the peak o f  late colonial revenue collection in 1812, but only 5 to 
10 percent below average annual revenues during the period o f highest 
collection between the late 1780s and 1812.
A som ew hat different picture emerges, if one takes into consideration 
the population base, upon which the collection o f  revenue rested. W ith  a 
population increase o f about 730,0 00 persons between the mid-1790s and
'Laxation in Harly Republican Peru, 1H21-1HH 315
1850, the per capita collection o f gross revenues during this period de­
clined from  28.9 reales to  23.3 reales.3 This turns out to represent a de­
cline o f  just under 20 percent nominally, but on the order o f m agnitude 
o f  43 percent in real term s (assum ing a 30 percent inflation rate for the 
period between the early 1800s and 1850). In o ther words, while the 
Peruvian national governm ent each year collected only slightly less gross 
revenues between 1825 and 1850 in real term s than the viceregal govern­
m ent had done during the years in which the Bourbon reform s showed 
m ost effectiveness, it collected considerably less taxes, duties, fees and 
other types o f charges from every man, woman and child under its juris­
diction, than its colonial predecessor had done.
T hree principal reasons m ight be adduced to  explain this incapacity o f 
the national governm ent to increase its revenues proportionally to  the 
rise o f population: 1. Declining administrative capacity to  collect reve­
nues due to  continued political disruptions. 2. A weak econom ic base, 
which saw no overall grow th com m ensurate w ith population grow th, or: 
3. A conscious policy o f lower taxation as a means to stim ulate the econ­
omy. W hich o f these factors carried m ost w eight can only be determ ined 
through looking at the major sources o f revenue individually and at fiscal 
policy. I shall argue that insufficient adm inistrative capacity to  organize 
collection was a constant, carried over from the colonial period to  the 
early decades after independence. Thus the major explanation for the 
stagnation o f  revenues m ust be sought in Peru’s econom ic condition be­
tween 1825 and 1850. Various governm ents realized that it was well-nigh 
impossible to  increase taxation w ithout im peding capital form ation and 
a gradual recovery o f  production in key sectors o f  the economy, as well as 
provoking a socially explosive em poverishm ent o f large sectors o f the 
population. The last ten years o f  the colonial regime had precisely 
brought about this kind o f overtaxation through extraordinary loans 
which resulted in a dramatic rise o f the internal deb t o f  the viceregal trea­
sury from  about eight million pesos in 1812 to  about tw enty million pesos 
in 1819 (A nna 1979: 16).To this tune Peru’s civil and ecclesiastic corpora-
3 This calculation is based on the following figures: Anna (1979: 16) gives mean 
revenue o f the Viceroyalty at 4.6 million pesos anually during the 1790s. In 1795 the 
population o f Peru was 1,271,297, including the Intendency of Puno, see Fisher 
(1970: 251-253) and Kubier (1952: 33); in 1850 Peru’s population stood at 
2,001,203, see Kubier (1952: 34); gross revenues o f the Peruvian national govern­
ment in 1850 were 5,828,040 pesos; see “Memoria del Ministro de Hacienda Gene­
ral D.Juan 'lorrico al Congreso de 1831,” in Dancuart and Rodriguez (1902-26 V: 
97).
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tions and her wealthy m erchant families had been decapitalized, a devel­
opm ent which during the final phase o f  the Wars o f  Independence 
reached the extrem e o f  stripping the churches o f  their gold  and silver and 
organizing the collection o f  the jewelry o f  Lima’s wealthy w om en. Thus 
during the following decades any attem pts to  increase revenue collection 
engendered the danger o f  dim inishing the w orking capital o f miners and 
merchants — or o f im peding its accumulation — and o f  cutting into the 
livelihood o f  the popular classes.
III. TH E M AJOR REVEN UE SOURCES
W hile collection from m ost major sources o f  income tended to  fluctuate 
sharply during the late colonial period, it is nevertheless possible to state 
that taxes and fees levied on m ining and m inting o f precious metals and 
the sale o f mercury contributed the largest share o f  the viceroyalty’s reve­
nue. Funds from the ramos o f  quintos o diezmos reales, señoreaje o derecho de 
amonedación, azogue de Huancavelica and azogue de Europa contributed be­
tween 15 and 25 percent o f  the net incom e o f the viceregal treasury’s 
caja matriz in Lima between the 1780s and 1820.4 After independence 
income from these sources collapsed, as the production o f  precious 
metals declined and a large share o f  plata piña  never found its way into 
the m ints o f Lima and Cuzco. D uring the 1820s the m ining and assaying 
charges only produced an income o f  about 150,000 pesos annually and 
the small surpluses produced by the m ints did no t flow into the general 
treasury, but rather were reinvested in the reconstruction o f  the mints, 
badly damaged during the wars, and their equipm ent with new machines 
(Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1827: 8,13-15; D ancuart and Rodríguez 1902- 
2 6, I I : 51). A t least since 182 8 miners and liberal politicians clamoured for 
a num ber o f major concessions as prerequisites for a recovery o f  Peru’s 
m ining industry, recognized by all as the country’s principal source of 
w ealth.M ost im portantly,M ariano de Rivero y Ustáriz in 1828 dem anded 
a considerable reduction o f  the colonial taxes cobo y  diezmos, im posing 
“derechos excesivos” on each marco o f  silver and quilate o f  gold produced. 
Rivero justified his dem and by suggesting that such a tax reduction
4 See TePaske (1986); in 1799, for example, these four ramos contributed 1,311,559 
pesos to the Viceroyalty’s gross revenues o f 4,833,507 pesos; for more details see 
TePaske and Klein (1982, I); see also Dancuart and Rodriguez (1902-26,1: 142- 
143).
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w ould in effect increase revenue collection from this source, as it would 
stim ulate production enormously. In 1828, the M inister o f Finance reject­
ed this proposal, bu t only one year later, in Decem ber 1829, Congress 
totally abolished cobos y diezmos and left in place a 5 percent charge on the 
pastas turned over to the m int as only tax on mining.
For several m onths, the Finance M inister did not apply this legislation, 
because as the liberal Santiago Tavara p u t it sarcastically, “im buido en las 
máximas de la adm inistración antigua de tom ar la plata para los gastos 
públicos donde prim ero se encontrara,” he w anted “una entrada segura o 
una alcancía para cada batallón, que todos juntos daban la seguridad de 
orden y de paz.”5
But since mid-1830, no m ore cobos y  diezmos were collected and all future 
adm instrations stuck to the abolition o f this major colonial tax. This 
inspite o f  revenue loss, which in 1831 M inister José Maria Pando estim at­
ed at close to  400,000 pesos annually (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1831:18; 
Tantaleán Arbulú 1983: 52-53). Miners were show ered with a num ber o f 
o ther financial concessions during the late 1820s and early 1830s, which 
also reduced fiscal revenues, such as an exem ption from the head tax, and 
the free im portation o f m ining equipm ent and machinery (Memoria de 
Hacienda, Perú 1828: 15-16; D ancuart and Rodriguez 1902-26, II: 29-30). 
Between 1830 and 1850, the only significant income which the national 
treasury drew  from m ining originated from  m inting operations and an 
export charge on precious metals. In 1846, both  am ounted to  432,890 
pesos, just over seven percent o f  gross revenues during that year.
The considerable reduction o f  state income from m ining during the early 
decades after independence was no t primarily a consequence o f  adm inis­
trative incom petence. Rather it represented a conscious, albeit reluc­
tantly introduced policy o f stim ulating the m ining sector in order to aid it 
in overcom ing the u tter decay in which it had found itself during the 
1820s.
T he m eteoric rise o f  custom s revenue to becom ing the mainstay of 
Peru’s public finances until the late 1840s and again after the W ar o f  the 
Pacific represents a shift from taxing the m ost visible and concentrated 
sectors o f  production to taxing im ports destined for consum ption. This 
shift can only partially be explained by the perform ance o f  the various 
sectors o f production and com merce after independence. W hile the
5 Tavara y Andrade (1951: 73); “Proyecto presentado a la Junta Consultativa de 
Hacienda por el Director de Minería D. Mariano Eduardo de Rivero” in Memoria de 
Hacienda, Perú (1828: 29-39 and, for rejection of plan by minister, 15-19).
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im port trade underw ent a shortlived boom  during the mid-1820s, p re­
cisely w hen the m ining sector reached its nadir, in the long run the level 
o f  im ports rem ained tied to silver output, before guano created an alter­
native source o f  foreign exchange earnings to finance im ports. Thus the 
shift towards relying to  a large part on revenues collected from customs 
expresses the realignm ent o f  the social base o f political pow er in inde­
penden t Peru. It primarily benefitted rural producers, while increasing 
the tax burden for urban consumers o f  im ported goods.
The last years o f  the colonial regime prepared the way for this major 
change in the com position o f revenues. W hile before 1775 almojarifazgos 
had rarely contributed m ore than five percent o f the net receipts o f 
Lima’s caja matriz, during the following decade the rapid expansion of 
overseas trade m ore than doubled custom s collections both in absolute 
and in relative terms. In order to deal w ith the severe fiscal crisis during 
the early phases o f  the Wars o f Independence, Viceroy Abascal in 1815 
approved as part o f  his revenue raising package, an increase o f  almojari­
fazgo rates by one percent to four percent and stiff extraordinary im port 
and export taxes on a num ber o f  key com m odities, such as Chilean 
wheat, tallow, Peruvian soap, textiles, wines, cascarilla and sugar. U nder 
the even m ore critical conditions o f  the last two years before San M artin’s 
invasion o f  Septem ber 1820, a period when the Spanish navy had lost its 
control over shipping in the Pacific, Viceroy Pezuela reluctantly granted 
an increasing num ber o f foreign m erchant ships licenses to disembark 
their cargo in Callao harbor. This measure was taken against heavy oppo ­
sition exclusively under fiscal considerations, “as the only m ethod o f sav­
ing the state”, as Pezuela w rote to  Spain. C otton goods introduced on 
foreign ships paid 50 percent custom s and other goods 36 percent. As a 
result, the viceregal aduana collected net revenues o f  2,965,085 pesos 
during 1819 and 1820, am ounting at least to a third o f the viceregal 
governm ent’s gross annual income (TePaske 1986: Table 2; Anna 1979: 
112-116, 140-145). The structure o f  the colony’s public revenues was 
rapidly assuming the shape which was to prevail in independent Peru. 
D uring the following decades, tariff policy evolved in the continuing 
struggle betw een short-term  fiscal exigencies and the interests o f  differ­
en t groups o f  merchants, hacendados, miners and artisans. Shifting coali­
tions between these interest groups and the governm ent led to erratic 
short-term  fluctuations o f  tariffs and customs regulation. It was by no 
means a foregone conclusion that all strata o f merchants were in favor o f 
lower tariffs, while artisans were the p roponents o f global protection 
(G ootenberg  1982: passim). T he political weakness o f the consignatarios
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during the 1820s resulted both  from the patrio ts’ reaction to the strong 
support which the Consulado had granted to the royalist cause until 1820 
and the g lu t o f  merchandise which the newly established foreign m er­
chants introduced during the m id-tw enties which threatened the liveli­
hood  o f  many Peruvian wholesalers and retailers (G ootenberg  1982: 
333-335; Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1822: 17, 28).
The highest pitch o f the protectionist campaign was reached with the ley 
de prohibiciones o f  1828, which completely forbade the im portation o f 
com m odities produced in Peru, such as cheap cottons, wheat and flour, 
and wine.6 This was obviously not a measure intended to increase cus­
tom s revenues, and so it is no t surprising that during the following years 
various adm inistrations repeatedly circumvented the law by granting 
special licenses to  im port prohibited  goods against substantial cash pay­
m ents o f custom s and cited fiscal exigencies for doing so.7 Contraband 
reached a peak during the years o f  the ley de prohibiciones and M inister o f 
Finance Pando estim ated that in 1831 600,000 pesos were escaping the 
treasury through the effects o f the law (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1831: 
22-23; Rivera Serna 1959: 439).
W ith their stocks o f  im ports undergoing slow depletion, during the 
1830s foreign consignatarios and Peruvian wholesalers began to form  a 
coalition, clamouring for reduced tariffs. Since the last years o f the first 
Gam arra adm inistration, they were increasingly supported by the 
governm ent — w hatever its ideological stance —, because at least the ter­
m ination o f  im port prohibitions would im prove the fiscal situation. 
G iven that Peru would depend on the fiscal revenue from custom s for 
many years to come,José María Pando suggested a middle path  between 
com plete free trade “and the system o f restrictions and prohibitions 
which we have established.”8
Indeed the commercial codes o f  1833,1834 and 1837 brought a gradual 
liberalization o f  foreign commerce, although their application remained 
lim ited due to  the frequent political disorders. T he commercial code o f
6 Tavara y Andrade (1951: 79-80); Basadre (1968-70, II: 27-31 and 347); Anonymus 
[Santiago Tavara y Andrade] (1831: 42-53).
7 Tavara y Andrade (1951: 79-80); “Manifiesto del General La Fuente (l8 3 l)” in 
Odriozola (1863-77, X: 376-377); Bonilla (Ms. 1970,1: 148).
8 Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1831: 23); Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1832: 6-9); G oo­
tenberg (1982: 335), places the emergence o f the coalition between foreign consi­
gnatarios and national wholesale merchants only around 1840; for evidence o f con­
tinuing conflicts o f  interests between foreign and national merchants during the 
mid-1830s, see Bonilla (Ms. 1970,1: 150).
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1840, which essentially rem ained in force until 1852, consolidated the 
trend towards lower tariffs, w ith im port duties between 3 1/2 and 32 per­
cent for m ost goods, special rates for merchandise also produced nation­
ally, and an abolition o f export duties except for precious metals.9 
It would seem that the Ministers o f Finance o f  the 1840s could live quite 
well with these reduced tariffs. In his Memoria for 1847, Castilla’s M inister 
o f  Finance M anuel del Rio expressed the connection which he perceived 
between the fiscal interests o f  the state and the liberalization o f  foreign 
trad e : “... N o ha perdido de vista el G obierno que es preciso conciliar en el 
réjimen de las aduanas la seguridad en el cobro de los intereses del erario 
con las facilidades que deben darse al comercio para su mas p ron to  espe- 
dición, y que de un m odo indirecto producen utilidad al Estado rem o­
viendo los embarazos que ahuyentan al comercio, y haciendo por consi­
guiente m ayor y mas activo el tráfico en nuestros puertos” (Memoria de 
Hacienda, Perú 1847: 10).
W hat were the effects o f  the rather significant changes o f the govern­
m e n t’s tariffand foreign trade policy betw een the mid-1820s and 1850 on 
the level o f  custom ’s revenue? Table 1 presents figures bo th  for customs 
revenue and British and French im ports in Peru, taken as the best avai­
lable measure for annual gross im ports. If  these figures even roughly 
approxim ate reality, they contain som e surprising results.
In the first place, mean annual custom s income did no t fluctuate very 
strongly during the first quarter century o f  Independence (see Table l). 
They reached a high level within a year after the defeat o f  the royalists and 
by the late 1840s they lay only 16 percent above this level. W hen im ports 
were declining during the early 1830s, bo th  a result o f  the glut left by the 
oversupply o f  the Peruvian m arket betw een 1825 and 1827 and the re­
strictive foreign trade regulations, custom s revenues were still increasing 
som ew hat between 1830 and 1833. To be sure, this may be partially 
explained through im provem ents in fiscal adm inistration during the 
tenure o f  Pando and Pérez de Tudela.10 But it also seems to  prove all 
those w rong w ho feared a loss o f revenue due to  the ley de prohibiciones. 
T he preem ption o f that law by granting special im port licenses on such 
key com m odities as wheat, flour and cotton  goods, apparently produced 
a high level o f  cash custom s revenue, which brought m ore income than 
the charges on these products under norm al trade conditions, w ith all the
9 For general outlines o f customs regulations and tariff policies between the 1820s 
and 1840s see Bonilla (Ms. 1970,1: 141-157,186-190) and Dancuart and Rodriguez 
(1902-26, II: 53-61, III: 56-58, IV: 51-53, V: 52-53).
10 This point is stressed by Rivera Serna (1959: 422).
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Table 1
Peruvian Customs Revenue and Imports from France and Great Britain by Five 
Year Annual Means, 1825-1849 (Current Values)
Five Year Customs Revenue (in Pesos) Imports From Great
Annual Britain and France
Means Callao1 All Index Value Index
Aduanas1 (in C)
1825-29 [l,26l,138]2 1,840,0002 100 604,234 100
1830-34 1,421,117 [2,073,409] 112.7 474,509 78.5
1835-39 1,101,806 [1,607,534] 87.4 573,212 94.7
1840-44 1,365,787 [1,992,683] 108.3 777,600 128.7
1845-49 [1,458,430] 2,134,430 116.0 1,071,659 177.3
1 The values in brackets have been extrapolated from the ratio between 
revenues for Callao and all aduanas for those years for which both figures 
existed.
2 Only for one year, 1826.
Sources'. Dancuart and Rodriguez (1902-26); Parliamentary Papers, House o f Com ­
mons, London; Bonilla (Ms. 1970).
possibilities to postpone paym ent, to  pay in paper m oney, or even to 
strike a deal w ith local custom s employees. T he slump o f customs collec­
tion between 1835 and 1839 (it actually started one year earlier) can only 
be understood  as a consequence o f the civil wars between the factions of 
Orbegoso, Santa Cruz, Salaverry, and Gamarra.
D uring the 1840s, Peruvian customs revenue began to show  a steady rise, 
which became m ore pronounced in the following decade. This rise was, 
however, much m ore m odest than that evidenced by the country’s 
im ports. W hile customs revenues barely rose by a third between the late 
1830s and the late 1840s, British and French im ports increased by nearly 
90 percent during the same period. This scissor-like developm ent of 
im ports and customs collection could only have been the effect either o f 
administrative deterioration in the collection o f customs, or o f the liber­
alized trade policy. Since, if anything, fiscal adm inistration became m ore 
effective in this decade, particularly during Castilla’s first presidency, we 
m ust conclude that the adoption o f the commercial code o f 1840 and 
various o ther decrees simplifying and deregulating foreign trade, in fact 
show ed the intended results: lower effective duties per unit o f im ports 
which flowed through the country’s customs houses. Inspite o f w ide­
spread contraband, then, the protective trade policies during the late 
1820s and early 1830s still showed a positive effect on the nation’s cus­
tom s revenues.
Until guano became a significant factor o f Peruvian state finances cus­
tom s income contributed between 32 and about 42 percent o f  the coun­
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try’s gross revenues.11 It was easily the largest single source o f  state 
finances, no t unlike the situation in many European countries during this 
period .12
Y et w ith another key revenue source o f  the colonial governm ent, inde­
p enden t Peru relinquished it w ithout concern for the fiscal conse­
quences: I am referring to  the alcabala, the sales tax levied at a rate o f 6 
percent since 1776 on nearly every com m odity each tim e it changed 
hands.13 W ith  annual revenues o f  between 600,000 and 800,000 pesos, 
the alcabala had contributed 12 to  20 percent o f  Peru’s colonial public 
finances since the late 1770s (TePaske 1986: Table 2; Anna 1979: 112; 
Fisher 1970: 107-109).
This source o f  revenue was largely abolished no later than 1826 by the 
commercial code o f  that year. A feeble attem pt to reintroduce alcabalas 
in 1831, as an expedient o f  imp roving the critical situation o f  the treasury 
was defeated by liberals in Congress, such as Santiago Tavara.14 W hat 
persisted th roughout the nineteenth  century was the alcabala de enajena­
ciones, a charge on every sales transaction over real estate to  be collected 
for the state by the notaries. This tax produced a revenue o f between
65,000 and 101,000 pesos annually during the 1840s, w ith a noticeable 
upw ard trend. Probably it produced considerably less during the late 
1820s and 1830s. In any case, since 1826, the alcabala, one o f the four 
major pillars o f the colonial treasury, was reduced to contributing be­
tw een 1 and 2.5 percent o f  the independent nation’s public finances, not 
by administrative inefficiency, but through a political decision.
11 Customs receipts as a percentage o f Peru’s gross national revenue: 1826: 31.4 per­
cent; 1839: 37.3 percent; 1846: 38.7 percent; 1847: 40.1 percent; Macera (1974: LV) 
cites figures o f about 46.9 percent for custom ’s share o f Peruvian national revenue 
between 1845 and 1849, w ithout indicating his sources.
12 In Great Britain, the £36,000,000 revenue from Customs and Excise constituted 
nearly two-thirds o f total governm ent revenue in 1827. O f this, at least half was col­
lected in customs duties on foreign trade; see Clapham (1967: 320).
13 For details on colonial alcabala regulations see Dancuart and Rodriguez (1902-26, 
I: 34-39).
14 This major change of Peru’s post-independence tax legislation has gone unno­
ticed by all m odern observers, including Dancuart, Basadre and Bonilla. Because 
o f the confusion reigning in this matter, I shall cite the relevant articles o f  the 
Reglamento de Comercio, promulgated on June 6, 1826:
“Sección Octava: Del Comercio por tierra
Art. 47. —Quedan abolidas de hoyen adelante las aduanas interiores, no debiendo 
subsistir sino las litorales y de fronteras que serán designadas por una ley especial. 
Art. 48. — Se extingue asimismo el seis por ciento de aumento de derechos sobre 
las mercaderías internadas a las provincias, pudiendo en su virtud conducirse
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How  can we explain this apparently sm ooth and uncontroversial aboli­
tion o f an im portant revenue source, a step which left very few traces in 
available contem porary publications?
It is quite obvious that the alcabala was a highly unpopular tax which 
caused great problem s in collection. It ham pered trade particularly in the 
sierra where it brought great disadvantages to the mostly illiterate arrie­
ros. Alcabala could only be efficiently collected with a costly and heavy- 
handed apparatus o f internal customs and a m ultitude o f  o ther officials 
controlling the. guías o f  all merchandise being transported. The abuses of 
alcabala collection had played a considerable role in provoking the cycle 
o f rebellions in the early 1780s, som ething that could no t have been for­
go tten  fifty years later (Anonym us [Santiago Tavara y Andrade] 1831: 55- 
56; O ’Phelan 1982).
T he losses o f  revenues from indirect taxes such as the charges on mining 
and m inting and the alcabala, inevitably brought forth an attem pt to 
increase direct taxes. San M artin’s step to abolish tributo in 1821, a neces­
sary symbolic measure to  signal the break with the colonial order to 
those victimized by it, had to be taken back only five years later, obviously 
for financial reasons. But this time, the Indian head tax was to  be 
em bedded within a contribución general, which, in accord with liberal p re­
cepts o f  equality, was to  weigh equally on all social and ethnic groups of 
Peruvian society. As Finance M inister Morales yU galde explained in 1827, 
the head tax was m ade extensive to all social classes, in order to  alleviate
libremente de un punto  à otro, con guia de aduana de su procedencia,la que no se 
concederá sino á naturales y ciudadanos del Perú.
Art. 52.—No causan de alcabala las producciones naturales é industriales del Perú 
en los lugares de su procedencia, transporte ó consumo, con tal que se haga el 
comercio de ellas, con guias de la aduana, ó del intendente ó gobernador del lugar 
de su extracción, sin cuyo requisito sufren la pena del seis por ciento de derechos 
applicables a los denunciantes.”
See Dancuart and Rodríguez (1902-26, II: 85); these regulations were essentially 
confirmed by later codes, as e.g., Art. 61-65 of the Codigo de Comercio o f  1840; see 
ibid .,Ill: 114-115; the idea ofD ancuart and Basadre that alcabalas were retained in 
principle by the code o f 1826, may have its origin in the ambiguous wording in the 
report to Congress by Minister o f  Finance Morales y Ugalde: “En el [the Codigo de 
Comercio] se supriman las aduanas internas, principio de multitudes de tropie­
zos; desaparece el aumento de las alcabalas y se eseptúan de derechos las mercancías 
estranjeras, que por cuenta de sus primeros especuladores, ó habiendo mudado 
de dominio, refluyen en lo interior de la república, con solo sufrir el primer 
derecho, del 30 por ciento [i.e. import duties] designado en uno de sus artículos” 
[my emphasis]; see Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1827: 19-20); on the attem pt to 
reestablish alcabalas in 1831 see Anonymus [Santiago Tavara y Andrade] (1851: 
55-56).
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the burden on any particular social class and to  obviate the need o f  reim- 
posing an indirect tax on “artículos de prim era necesidad y consum o” 
(Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1827: 24-27). Here the replacem ent function 
o f Bolivar’s direct tax package for the reduction o f  indirect tax levies, 
especially a sales tax, is m ade explicit.
T he direct taxes which were o f any im portance until the end o f  the nine­
teen th  century were all established within a few years between 1825 and 
1828. Besides the two parts o f general capitation tax, the contribuciones de 
indígenas and de castas, these included levies on net income from real 
estate (contribución de predios rústicos y  urbanos), and from commerce, 
trades and professions (contribución de patentes and de industrias). It is strik­
ing how  m ost Finance M inisters o f the period stressed that all estab­
lished direct taxes were only drawing on the net product o r income of 
any property  or trade, and no t on its principal or capital. These m en were 
im bued with physiocratic concepts, even if these seemed difficult to 
apply in a society with large sectors for which the concept o f net rent was 
either meaningless or extremely difficult to  transform  into an accurately 
measurable quantity.15
T he contribución de indígenas (see Table 2) was not only by far the m ost 
lucrative o f  these taxes — it produced about three-fourths o f  total reve­
nue from all direct taxes —, but also the one which underw ent least ad­
ministrative and legal confusion during the three decades following its 
reestablishm ent. This was a consequence o f the politically much less 
controversial nature o f the contribución de indígenas com pared with the 
direct taxes levied on o ther social groups. But it also reflected the ease 
with which republican Peru could adapt the colonial machinery and 
procedures o f  collection for the Indian head tax: Collection followed the 
ordinances o f 1784 w ith only m inor changes o f rates, which varied region­
ally in any case (K ubier 1952: 5-6).
For the few years after independence, for which we possess figures on the 
contribución de indígenas (in many years only a lum p sum for contribuciones 
directas was published), its revenue lay between five and thirty percent 
above the mean income from  this source during the 1790s. Collection inc­
reased som ew hat during the 1840s over the first fifteen years after 
the tax’s reintroduction, mainly because o f Indian population growth.
15 For examples demonstrating that Finance Ministers were thinking in these terms 
see Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1827: 24-27), and Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1847: 
4-5); for similar problems in the application of physiocratic taxation principles in 
Western Europe see Ardant (1975: 178-181).
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Table 2
Contribución de Indígenas (Gross and Per Capita Values), 1795-1850
Year Gross Revenue Indian Population Per Capita Revenue
1795 986,702.5 pesos1 732,724 1.35 pesos
1826-27 1,039,402 pesos2 998,846 1.04 pesos
1850 1,237,795 pesos 1,185,865 1.04 pesos
1 Mean annual revenue collection, 1790-99.
2 According to matrículas; not necessarily collected.
Sources'. Fisher (1970); Miller (1975); Kubier (1952); Dancuart and Rodriguez 
(1902- 26)
Per head o f  Indian population, the republican governm ent collected less 
in current pesos from this source than the colonial regime had done dur­
ing the 1790s. The decline, however, was probably quite a bit smaller than 
the roughly 25 percent suggested by Table 2, since the population figure 
for the 1790s is likely to  be too  low, while the figures for the republican 
period are high. In part, this minimal drop in the per capita collection of 
contribución de indígenas may express the measure o f  decline o f  adm inis­
trative effectiveness. But it also reflects the frequent practice o f republi­
can governm ents o f exem pting local com m unities and even whole p rov­
inces from paying contribuciones de indígenas for diverse reasons, such as 
droughts, falling income due to  war, or political expedients (Rivera Serna 
1959: 411-412).In term s o f  constant pesos, per capita collection o f  course 
declined significantly, say by 30 to  40 percent, between 1790s and 1850. 
But this was merely the consequence o f m aintaining, in term s o f current 
pesos, the rates o f the contribución de indígenas equal to  those charged 
during the late colonial period.
This political decision, not to increase the rates o f the contribución de indí­
genas p roportionate to  the rate o f  inflation already explains a large share 
o f  the decline o f the Peruvian state’s gross revenue to which we alluded 
above. There can be little doubt, then, that whatever its absolute burden 
on the Indian peasants’ economy, the contribución de indígenas weighed 
relatively less on this social group during the early decades after indepen­
dence than it had during the Bourbon reform era.
It was the im position o f the o ther direct taxes which constituted the early 
republic’s major reform o f the fiscal structure. Because they were po liti­
cally controversial and posed great administrative problem s, govern­
m ents changed or even abolished the taxes in a confusing stream o f laws 
and decrees, and their contribution to  gross revenue rem ained m odest 
beyond the period under consideration here.
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But European countries had found it no less difficult to gradually shift 
taxation from consum ption to production on an equitable basis since the 
m id-eighteenth century. O ne may cite the famous cadastre o f  the Duchy 
o f Milan which took  forty years to  com plete. In fact, many enlightened 
absolutists failed in their attem pts to im pose a direct tax on the net p ro d ­
uct o f  agriculture. After the end o f  the N apoleonic Wars especially the 
economically m ost successful nations o f  W estern Europe increasingly 
relied on indirect taxes on articles o f consum ption. U nder strong public 
pressure, the Vansittart adm inistration in G reat Britain saw itself forced 
to repeal the wartim e income tax in 1816. Curiously, it was in som e of 
those nations, in which the econom y rem ained largely pre-industrial dur­
ing much o f the nineteenth  century, where the income tax and other 
direct taxes played an im portant role relatively early, as, for example, in 
Italy (A rdant 1975: 208-223; Dowell 1965, II: 262-263). This was in a 
sense also Peru’s situation in 1825: The econom y was too  weak, its struc­
ture too archaic for indirect taxes alone to  produce the needed revenues. 
Because o f this weak economic base m en as Larrea y Loredo and Pando 
gladly em ployed the enlightened fiscal principles to  assess new direct 
taxes, such as castas, predios rústicos y  urbanos, patentes and industrias. But it 
was the same weak econom ic base which rendered these taxes relatively 
inefficient and brought forth strong opposition.
In order to  minimize “double taxation”, the tax laws from the very begin­
ning established a system o f  m utual exem ptions, whereby those who had
to pay contribución de patentes did no t need to  pay contribución de castas and 
de industrias and according to  which contribución de predios urbanos was 
only to be assessed in the tow ns in which contribución de patentes was 
levied.16
This latter tax, a proportional gradated levy on the net incom e from com ­
merce, crafts and professions assessed through the various gremios, was 
only collected in Lima and five or six o ther cities. Lima alone produced 
nearly 80 percent o f  revenue from the patentes tax, am ounting in total to 
between 60,000 and 80,000 pesos annually. The contribuciones de castas — a 
flat rate o f  first five and later three pesos on adult males — and de industria 
— four percent on net incom e from  property and trades — primarily was 
levied upon the mestizo and white population in provincial and district 
level capitals, earning their living as hacienda owners, adm inistrators and 
tenants, as lawyers or notaries, as muleteers or traders.
16 See the decree establishing the contribución general o f Aug. 11,1826, in D ancuartand 
Rodriguez (1902-26, I: 277-278).
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This made it possible to identify specific taxes w ith m ore circumscribed 
social groups and allowed the caudillo politicians to ingratiate them ­
selves w ith the one or the other group by abrogating the specific tax 
which applied to  it. Between the late 1820s and 1845, this produced an 
“on-again/off-again” succession o f decrees abrogating and reestablishing 
the contribuciones de castas, industrias and patentes. In 1829, General La 
Fuente, an A requipeño with his political base in the Southern Sierra, 
abrogated the contribuciones de castas and de industrias-, presumably these 
taxes deepened the economic crisis o f  the affected social groups and the 
taxes, due to resistance o f the population, had hardly brought in any reve­
nue (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1829a: 16; Rivera Serna 1959: 414-415). 
The same decree reestablished the contribución de patentes, abrogated by 
Congress in 1827.
In this connection, one should recall that it was during La F uente’s sho rt­
lived caretaker governm ent, that im port licences for flour and cotton 
cloth circumventing the ley de prohibiciones were granted for the first tim e 
against the loud pro test o f  Lima’s jun ta  departamental and the city’s na­
tional merchants. Together these measures suggest that La Fuente p u r­
sued a fiscal policy favoring the provincial mestizo and criollo groups and 
shifting the tax burden towards Lima’s merchants, artisans and shopkee­
pers. Again in 1839 the Congress o f Huancayo, under the influence o f the 
same Gamarra, who had revoked La Fuente’s tax decrees ten years earlier, 
abolished the contribución de castas, reasoning that this tax “ha recaído 
sobre personas miserables cuyos recursos apenas bastan para sostener las 
primeras necesidades de la vida sin aliviar las del Estado” (D ancuart and 
Rodríguez 1902-26,111: 53-54,102). It was not reintroduced again during 
the following ten years.
For som e contem porary observers like Castilla’s Finance Minister, M a­
nuel del Rio, this heightened the injustice o f the contribución de indígenas. 
For the M inister the failure to maintain a similar capitation tax on all 
o ther social and ethnic groups “destruye el principio de igualdad [...], 
porque hace pesar con m ayor fuerza el im puesto sobre los indígenas, que 
son la clase mas m enesterosa de la nación” (Cuenta general 1847: IV; Memo­
ria de Hacienda, Perú 1847: 3). D el Río blamed the abolition o f  the castas 
tax for a 30 percent reduction in direct tax collections from 1845 to  1846. 
Since revenue from  castas had always been minimal, this was primarily 
the consequence o f  the fact that now m ore Indians attem pted to  pass the 
color line for tax purposes.
In his M emoria for 1847 Del Rio dem onstrated the whole dilemma and 
the ambivalence which the Indian head tax produced in enlightened fis-
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cal officers o f the criollo state. On the one hand he announced the ardent 
desire o f  the governm ent to  reduce the contribución de indígenas “as soon 
as the urgent necessities o f  the treasury perm it it.” O n the other hand he 
suggested that the law perm itting  Indians to sell their land to non- 
Indians should be changed merely on fiscal grounds, because it tended to 
diminish income from the contribución de indígenas as Indians w ithout 
land paid a lower rate (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1847). As much as Peru’s 
ruling elite found the Indian head tax inequitable and shocking to  their 
liberal ideas, it remained imprescindible for governm ent finances. 
W hile the contribución de castas undoubtedly faced the greatest resistance, 
that encountered by the o ther new direct taxes was only different in 
degree but not in kind. T hose to  be taxed refused or evaded assessment, 
thus ham pering the drawing up o f  the tax lists.17 It is clear that many o f 
the lists remained incom plete and often weighted the net income o f the 
different tax payers totally unproportionately, no t only the result o f con­
cealment but also o f  inherent problem s o f  income m easurem ent in agrar­
ian societies. Concerning the contribución de predios rústicos, for example, 
the four percent tax on the real or calculated rental income from  agricul­
tural land, well into the tw entieth century large landholders were under- 
taxed. Owners o f the smallest landholdings (m ostly poor Indian peas­
ants), producing a rent o f less than fifty pesos annually, were exem pted 
from this tax by law o f 1840 and probably had not been matriculated 
before this date either (Dancuart and Rodriguez 1902-26,111: 102).Thus 
the tax weighed unproportionately heavily on the owners o f small fincas 
and on the wealthiest peasant strata. To a lesser extent a similar distribu­
tion o f  the tax burden probably also characterized the patentes, industrias 
and predios urbanos taxes.
The weakest link in the fiscal adm inistration was to  be found on the p ro ­
vincial level, w ith those officials responsible for collecting the direct 
taxes. In fact it should be stressed that independent Peru’s attem pt to 
establish a program  o f direct taxes required pu tting  into place a whole 
new layer o f  fiscal adm inistration. W ith the one exception o f  tributo, the 
colonial treasury depended overwhelmingly on taxes which could be col­
lected directly by the cajas reales and special fiscal institutions, such as the 
alcabala adm inistration and the mints, in o ther w ords all central and re­
gional offices staffed with full-time financial bureaucrats. The republic 
could not afford to  create special treasury offices in each o f the roughly
17 For reports on tax payers’ resistance see Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1827: 24-27);
Rivera Serna (1959: 414-415); Kubier (1952: 7, n. 22).
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sixty provinces. And so the governm ent adopted the same m ethod of 
collecting all direct taxes, which the viceroyalty had used for tribute col­
lection : Entrusting the chief executive officer o f the province, the subpre- 
fecto, w ith the responsibility for tax collection against paym ent o f a com ­
mission. However, it was one th ing for a colonial creole subdelegado with 
the aid o f  curacas to  enforce the paym ent o f  tributo by Indian peasants, 
and quite another for a creole or mestizo subprefecto during the early 
republican period to  collect taxes from landholders, traders, p rofession­
als and artisans hailing from the same or a m ore elevated socio-ethnic sta­
tus as he himself. The subprefecto lacked the pow er to  enforce the tax 
laws against these groups and often, for politico-clientelistic reasons, he 
did no t w ant to  enforce them . This was, to be sure, largely the conse­
quence o f  the lack o f autonom y o f the governm ent machinery from  the 
volatile caudillo politics, as M anuel del Rio po inted  out in 1847: “La suc- 
cesión de revoluciones que ha colocado en el m ando de las provincias a 
jefes sin garantías y al antojo del m andatario que solo atendía a conser­
varse en el puesto, sin exijir de sus prosélitos mas que adhesión personal, 
ha producido la dislocación que se advierte en el sistema rentístico por 
consecuencia del olvido de las leyes.”18
Nevertheless, one should not forget that, from the p o in t o f  view o f “state 
building,” this ineffectiveness in the collection o f  direct taxes cannot be 
seen as falling back behind the level o f organizational infrastructure 
already achieved by the colonial regime. Rather, as po in ted  ou t above, it 
was the first a ttem pt at broadening the fiscal control over society. George 
K ubier encountered in the Archivo H istórico o f the M inisterio de 
Hacienda 164 matrículas on all direct taxes (including indígenas') for the 
period 1825-1854 and probably half again as many m ore are destroyed or 
lost in private or regional archives.19 W hatever their im perfections as 
cadastres o f real property and net rents, they represented a significant 
first step. Malcolm Deas has po in ted  ou t in a recent article, that any seri­
ous attem pt at levying direct taxes in Colom bia only began during the
18 Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1847: 6); for another example o f the pervasive dissatis­
faction with the subprefects’ fiscal administration, see also Memoria de Hacienda, 
Perú (1831: 6-13).
19 Kubier (1952: l); I have located two further matrículas de predios rústicos between 
the 1820s and 1850s for a single province (Azángaro).
20 Deas (1982: 300-302); I am grateful to Reinhard Liehr for pointing out this article 
to me. Marcello Carmagnani reports that the Mexican central and state govern­
ments also failed in extending fiscal administration to the provincial level (Car­
magnani 1983: 291).
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1850s, thirty years later than in Peru.20 The difference probably lay in the 
stronger statist and centralist tradition in Peru since colonial times. 
Ju st as the capitation tax for non-Indians was making its dem ise from the 
Peruvian scene during the mid- 1840s, som e o f  the o ther direct taxes, par­
ticularly the contribución de predios rústicos, were showing signs o f  becom ­
ing m ore accepted, as revenues from these sources increased. The 
receipts from  the tax on rental income from urban and rural real estate 
property  had grown from 41,000 pesos in 1830 to  between 125,000 and
147,000 pesos during the late 1840s (D ancuart and Rodriguez 1902-26, II: 
53 and IV: 53; Cuenta General 1847). D uring the first presidency o f  Castilla 
total income from direct taxes o ther than the Indian head tax contrib­
uted between four and six percent o f gross revenues. Including the contri­
bución de indígenas direct taxes accounted for between 22.5 and 32 percent 
o f  gross revenue betw een 1826 and the late 1840s21.
Besides the m ajor sources o f  income which we have looked at so far, the 
governm ent continued to  draw revenues from  a great variety o f  taxes, 
fees and rents, nearly all o f  which were o f colonial origin. A m ong these 
were to be found the stamp tax, postal charges, the governm ent’s share 
o f tithes, m onopoly rights on the sale o f  tobacco and nitrate, fees on va­
cant civil and ecclesiastic positions, the ren t or sale o f national property 
and o f  the extinguished colonial corporations, such as inquisition, tempo­
ralidades (Jesuit property) and the caja de censos (Indian com m unity 
fund). M ost o f  these charges lingered on th roughout the period under 
consideration, although many were either inefficient as sources o f 
incom e — with the costs o f  collection high and the receipts low — or were 
odious to  the creole political elite (D ancuart and Rodriguez 1902-26, II: 
50-51; Ugarte 1977: 104). M ore than with the policies towards the major 
revenue sources, their endurance was a consequence o f  fiscal conve­
nience, as their collection raised little opposition from the tax payers. 
Inspite o f  attem pts to  reduce the rate o f  tithes since 1832 and its denun­
ciation by M anuel del Rio as obstructive to agriculture, collection contin­
ued nearly at the same level as during the late colonial period until the 
mid-1840s, w hen they began to  w hither away before being finally abol­
ished in the mid-1850s.22
The alm ost total disappearance o f  revenues from the production and sale
21 Tantaleán Arbulú (1983: 54) suggests that the contribution de indígenas alone 
accounted for 31 and 34 percent o f  current governm ent revenue between 1826 and 
1830.
22 Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1847: 8-9); on diezmo legislation see Dancuart and Ro­
driguez (1902-26, II 51-53, 117, 189-190, 220, and III: 54, 91-92).
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o f tobacco, a ramo which during the last years o f the royal m onopoly had 
becom e a major source for the viceregal treasury, is shrouded in confu­
sion and needs further study. D uring the years o f the Wars o f Indepen­
dence only the sale o f tobacco in the cities had remained a governm ent 
prerogative. But in 1826, the m onopoly was reestablished, and this “bajo 
una forma mas aborrecible e inmoral que la del estanco real,” as the u n ­
flinching liberal Santiago Tavara tells us (Tavara y Andrade 1951: 72).
In the following years, the m onopoly was apparently farmed out, for the 
small am ount o f 20,000 pesos annually. But contraband im ports were 
massive since they were cheaper than the dom estic tobaccos. The p ro ­
ducers in Chachapoyas could only secure the m arketing o f  their expen­
sive product through a law which granted them  the paym ent o f taxes in 
tobacco. Inspite o f an unclear legal situation, the m onopoly disappeared 
during the 1830s and the only tax remaining on dom estic tobaccos was a 
special sales tax, applied to  the debt am ortization fund o f the caja de arbi­
trios. The basic problem , because o f  which revenues from  dom estic tobac­
cos evaporated before the treasury’s eyes, seems to  have been that due to 
various factors, Peru’s tobacco production could no t com pete with 
Cuban and U.S. im ports and would have required heavy protection, 
which many creole politicians were not willing to  grant due to  the 
unpleasant experiences with the royal m onopoly.23 
Taken together, all these m inor taxes, charges and other types o f  govern­
m ent income probably fluctuated m ore sharply from year to  year than the 
major sources o f revenue did between the 1820s and 1850, simply because 
som e items, such as income from the sale o f national property, was only 
collected sporadically. Both because o f such sales, which were particularly 
frequent during the 1820s and the O rbegoso and Santa Cruz adm inistra­
tions, and o f the greater im portance o f income from  the sale o f dom estic 
tobacco, I suspect that the share o f the m inor ramos gradually declined 
from  the 1820s to  the 1840s. In 1846, they still produced about 250,000 
pesos, or about four percent o f gross revenues.
The 1840s w itnessed the rise o f Peruvian guano sales. But their im por­
tance for the Peruvian treasury was som ew hat delayed, as the govern­
m ent only slowly realized the income earning potential o f the fertilizer, 
and the discovery o f  an alternate source before the coast o f Africa 
depressed dem and during the mid-1840s. Only since 1847 did advances
23 Tavara y Andrade (1951: 111); Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1822:20-21); Rivera Serna 
(1959:415); Memoria de Hacienda, Perú (1831:24-25); Anonymus [Santiago Tavara y 
Andrade] (1831: 53-58).
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from guano consignm ents begin to  contribute significant funds to the 
treasury w ith som e regularity. Yet until the early 1850s, the share o f  guano 
income rem ained smaller than that o f customs duties and direct taxes.24 
As in many other aspects o f  the country’s fiscal structure, Castilla’s first 
presidency was, also in this regard, a period o f  transition.
IV. FISCAL DEFICITS
It was very com m onplace during the early decades after independence 
for ordinary income to fall short o f  expenditures. This was o f  course the 
consequence o f  the u tte r absense o f control by the Ministry o f Finance 
over how  m ost o f  the revenue was sp e n t: The Peruvian Congress, am ong 
w hose m em bers only a handful had an inkling o f  understanding and/or 
in terest in concrete fiscal questions, essentially abrogated its responsibil­
ity as controller o f  the public purse string, by never deliberating about any 
budget proposal prior to  1847, twenty-six years after independence 
(Basadre 1968-70, II: 44). Because o ther ministries failed to supply the 
Finance M inister w ith precise data on their required funds, the sporadic 
earlier attem pts to draw up budgets anyhow, for example by Pando in 
1831, were necessarily highly unrealistic (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1827: 
48-51). But the major problem  was that much o f the public revenue was 
spent decentrally, w ithout any regard to  possible budgetary limitations. 
T he departm ental adm inistrations spent funds collected in the tesorerías 
departamentales regionally as they deem ed necessary. An even graver 
problem  o f fiscal control was o f  course posed by military units stationed 
in the provinces which laid their hands on as many public funds as they 
could (Rivera Serna 1959: 403, 424-426; Tavara y A ndrade 1951: 55). In 
effect, the tesorería general in Lima only controlled part o f the public reve­
nues. Since the need for funds was greatest in the capital, central treasury 
carried the brunt o f  the deficit (Memoria de Hacienda, Perú 1828: 19-20). 
G iven this often recurring situation, and the enlightened principle 
avowed by m ore than one M inister o f Finance, that the budget should be 
balanced, one has to  be struck by the extrem e reticence o f  early republi­
can governm ents to  increase taxation.
After the enactm ent o f  the package o f direct taxes during Bolivar’s reign, 
which, as we have seen, in good part was m eant to replace abolished or
24 Ugarte (1977:112-114); Macera (1974: LV, cuadro 12); the table contains almost cer­
tainly miscalculations for the late 1840s.
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reduced taxes from other ramos, the major trend soon pointed  towards 
reduction o f taxes. W hile a few m ore sources o f income were p u t on the 
books by governm ents during the 1830s and 1840s — such as the impuesto 
a los licores—m ore were abrogated o rthe ir rates lowered. Again and again, 
the Finance Ministers exclaimed in critical financial situations that som e­
how  rather the urgent fiscal needs had to  be m et w ithout further burden­
ing the taxpayers. Thus, after describing the critical shortages o f the na­
tional treasury,José María de Pando w rote in 1831: “¿Que medios adoptar 
para hacer que se m inore sucesivamente este deficit? A um entar las con­
tribuciones directas es cosa absolutam ente im posible; la miseria de los 
pueblos es extrema, y con suma dificultad se pagan las existentes: el p ro ­
ducto de las indirectas sería susceptible de acrecentam iento; pero este 
efecto necesariamente habría de ser lento y progresivo” (Memoria de 
Hacienda, Perú 1831: 28).
Three factors contributed to  m ost governm ents’ decision to  seek funds 
for overcom ing deficits by means o ther than through raising taxes: l) 
Usually the governm ent needed extrafunds in the short term, because — 
due to  deficient accounting — the lack o f income to disfray all necessary 
expenditures was discovered only immediately before it occurred: Rais­
ing new taxes would take too long to help. 2) N ew  taxes were dangerous 
politically in a period, in which all social groups w ith a voice in public 
affairs were complaining about their em poverishm ent. 3) U ndoubtedly, 
the creole political elite was influenced by the growing tendency in the 
major W est-European countries, especially England, to  lower the tax bur­
den o f  the population between the 1820s and 1840.
After Peru’s public credit had collapsed as early as 1825, when the servic­
ing o f the two loans contracted in London in 1823 and 1825 was no t con­
tinued, the country had no access to  the international capital markets 
until 1847, when it became possible again to  contract loans in England 
secured by guano (M athew 1970b). D uring the intervening tw enty-tw o 
years extraordinary funds to plug up deficits in the budget had to be 
raised in Peru itself. The governm ents essentially em ployed three 
m ethods to  reach this goal: O utright loans, voluntary or otherw ise; 
advances on future revenues; tem porary reduction or non-paym ent of 
civil and military salaries.
In contrast to the foreign debt, which, while never renounced, was essen­
tially neglected for close to  twenty years, all these types o f internal debts 
engendered a reduction o f  revenues and increased expenditures in the 
short and medium  term . W hile the Peruvian governm ent managed to 
hold the foreign creditors at bay by claiming absolute indigence, it could
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never do the same with the holders o f  the internal deb t for long. W ithou t 
at least partial repaym ent o f creditors in Peru, the last source o f  credit 
would have dried up, and the political base o f  the republic would have 
been eroded, as the governm ents owed to  too  many merchants, miners, 
landholders, bureaucrats, military officers, and professionals, all those 
groups w ho could exert political influence.
Foreign and Peruvian merchants, w ho were the major contributors o f 
loans to the governm ent, m ight complain about the insecure business 
conditions created by repeated erogations. But usually they were in a 
good  position to im pose favorable term s, when the treasury w anted to 
borrow  money. As security for the repaym ent o f the loans, the govern­
m en t was willing to adm it debt certificates as part paym ent o f  certain 
taxes and charges, am ong them  custom s duties. D uring the late 1820s, 
when debt certificates were traded at a discount o f  up to 75 percent, m er­
chants could even make speculative profits by buying such billetes and 
using them  at face value to  pay in part the im port duties on their m er­
chandise.25 It should also be m entioned in passing that the governm ent’s 
practice o f accepting depreciated instrum ents o f the public deb t at their 
nom inal value in lieu o f  custom s paym ent, effectively lowered the tariff 
rates.
Obviously the practice o f asking for advances on tax paym ents or o ther 
ordinary charges had an adverse effect on future short-term  revenue col­
lection. This practice, which finally led to the huge disastrous advances 
on future consignm ents o f  guano during the 1850s and 1860s, began no 
later than 1828, when during the war with Gran Colombia the Finance 
M inister G aspar de Rosas proposed to fill an urgent requirem ent o f one 
million pesos by advance paym ent o f  all direct taxes by half a year. Rosas 
expressed his conviction that the citizens would understand this m ea­
sure, as it was aimed at avoiding new extraordinary taxes {Memoria de 
Hacienda, Perú 1828: 19-20). By 1845, this fiscal practice had becom e so 
widespread that the Aduana de Callao, instead o f  being creditor, owed 
412,505 pesos and the Casa de M oneda 293,000 pesos. In the words o f 
Emilio Dancuart, “cada renta fiscal ofrecía al G obierno no solo una suma 
de dinero que consum ir sino un recurso más para pedir adelantos á los 
que debían pagarla en lo fu turo” (D ancuart and Rodríguez 1902-26, III: 
49).
25 See Camprubí Alcázar (i960: 108-109); for an analysis o f the, relatively late, rise of 
state dependence on mercantile credits in Rosa’s Buenos Aires o f the early 1840s 
see Halperin Donghi (1982: 219).
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The reduction or non-paym ent o f  salaries both  to  the bureaucracy and to 
the army officers at times m ust have been practiced for fairly long periods 
o f  time and one w onders to  which degree discontentm ent over lack o f 
paym ent am ong military and civilian personal m ight have been respon­
sible for the instability o f  the one or the other regime. Even though the 
governm ent had been repaying not inconsiderable am ounts o f debts on 
past salaries and pensions and som e o f  the outstanding debt may have 
been transform ed into general certificates o f  the national debt, by 
Decem ber 1846 the public debt on civil and military salaries and pensions 
still am ounted to  over2 ,000,000 pesos {Cuentageneral 1847: unnum bered 
table). The governm ent realized the dangers inherent in this deb t and 
the largest loan on guano before 1850, a loan from 1848 am ounting to
850,000 pesos, was contracted and earmarked (although no t spent) ex­
clusively for the purpose o f repaying past salaries {Memoria de Hacienda, 
Perú 1949: 13-15).
Given the obviously debilitating effects o f this type o f deficit spending 
for the state and the econom y o f a country, which had no t much o f  any 
credit infrastructure, it remains hard to  understand why it was followed. 
To be sure, in many ways it was simply the continuation o f a fiscal de­
m eanor o f the colonial regime, which in Peru had borrow ed at a disa­
strous rate during its final decade, no t to  speak o f the long tradition of 
deficit spending o f Spain at least since Philipp II.
It is significant that a keen contem porary practitioner o f financial politics 
as M anuel del Rio, felt that the weight o f  Spanish tradition was greater in 
public finances than in m ost o ther areas o f  society {Memoria de Hacienda, 
Perú 1849: 6). W hile he, however, only m eant to po in t out all the nega­
tive, debilitating effects o f the Spanish heritage, it is clear that the young 
Peruvian republic also benefitted from a fairly strong colonial fiscal infra­
structure. Both early republican Peru’s continued capacity to collect reve­
nue at about the same level as the late colonial regime and its adoption o f 
deficit spending, as well as a chaotic system o f  public accounting owed 
much to the “Spanish tyranny,” as the republican creoles liked to  call their 
colonial past.
But deficit spending also reflected the social basis o f politics in early 
republican Peru: Spending could not be controlled, because the machin­
ery o f state had lost its autonom y and became dependent on contending 
politico-military factions through w hom  powerful social interest groups 
could exercise a rather im m ediate influence on economic and fiscal poli­
cies. In this political atm osphere, it p roved impossible to levy new direct 
taxes — or make those established in 1824-26 m ore efficient —, because
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this would inevitably have fallen onto  those classes on which, in varying 
coalitions, the regime depended for political support, namely various 
groups o f  merchants, large landholders and artisans in the major cities. 
After the late 1820s, neither could the rate o f  indirect taxes be raised, both  
because the grow ing political strength o f im porters and wholesalers, but 
also since protectionism  seem ed out o f  tune with the ideas o f  the tim e in 
Europe, an elem ent no t to be underestim ated for the decision making 
process o f  the creole political elite.
Thus, under the given social and political circumstances, there really 
seem ed to exist no alternative to  raising the needed additional revenues 
through loans and o ther forms o f credit. It seem ed acceptable, because it 
hurt the politically powerful groups, particularly merchants, relatively 
little, since they used the paym ent o f loans to the governm ent as a tool to 
extract o ther advantages. At the same tim e it concealed the financial bur­
den which it placed on o ther social groups better than the levy o f new 
taxes could.
V. TH E SOCIAL IN C ID E N C E  OF GROSS REVENUE
We have now  arrived at a place where we can profitably raise the question 
as to how  the burden o f  taxes, loans and o ther charges collected by the 
Peruvian state between the 1820s and 1840s, was distributed socially.The 
conventional answer has been that it favored particularly the creole 
hacendados and fell particularly heavily on the Indian peasantry.26 The 
problem  with this view, which certainly has som e merits, is that it is based 
only on a consideration o f  direct taxation.
At the outset, it should be stressed that to  a certain degree taxation in 
early republican Peru m aintained a typical feature o f  ancien régime fiscal 
structures: It rem ained quite particularistic and did no t yet achieve a high 
degree o f universality. T hat is to say, due to  special tax exem ptions, re­
gionally differentiated problem s o f collection, as well as a great many 
municipal and local taxes m em bers o f the same class were no t neces­
sarily taxed at the same rate th roughout the w hole nation.
26 See, for example, Yepes del Castillo (1972: 42);Tantaleán Arbulú (1983: 56) views 
the tax policy of Peru’s “Estado Caudillista”as reproducing the “división estamen­
tal socio-étnica colonial de criollos e indígenas;” this view underestimates the 
reformist efforts o f early republican fiscal concepts, which, as I hope to have 
shown, clearly sought to move towards a new vision o f society, whatever its suc­
cess.
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Leaving this problem  aside, any analysis o f the social incidence o f the tax 
burden needs to  consider«// sources o f state revenue: direct taxes as well 
as indirect taxes, but also the credits with which the deficits were 
financed.
W ith this in m ind, it is plain that Peru’s early republican taxation was 
highly regressive. Three-fourths o f the direct taxes were levied upon the 
large mass o f rural poor, the Indian peasants. The remaining direct taxes 
hit small shopkeepers, traders, artisans and interm ediate landholders 
relatively harder than large landholders, im porters and wholesalers. The 
largest chunk o f revenues, im port duties, primarily burdened the poorer 
strata o f  the larger cities. These strata consum ed m ost o f the im ported 
cheap textiles and food stuffs, which constituted the lion’s share o f  gross 
im ports. D uties on luxury im ports paid by the wealthy groups both in the 
cities and in the countryside would appear to  have been o f  secondary 
importance.
As to dom estic credits to  finance the budget deficits, it seems obvious 
that the urban m iddle and lower classes bore the main brunt. Merchants, 
but also large landholders often had possibilities to  get som ething in 
return for their loans to  the governm ent, and found ways to redeem  the 
debt certificates they held at face value. N o t so the hundreds o f middle 
and lower level bureaucrats w ho lost millions o f pesos in salaries, o r the 
small urban shopkeepers, many artisans and their employees, who con­
tributed to forced loans. Mostly they deem ed themselves fortunate if 
they could redeem  the billetes they held or the paper money issued in 1822 
and 1823 at the much depreciated m arket rate.
It would seem then that besides the generally regressive structure o f 
Peru’s early republican taxation, through which both  urban and rural 
lower classes contributed relatively m ore than im porters, wholesalers 
and large landholders there is a second and may be m ore significant, 
because novel bias to  the social incidence o f taxation betw een the 1820s 
and 1840s: a shift o f  the tax burden from the rural provinces to the major 
urban centers. After all, it was not only larger landholders who fared quite 
well in the countryside. We have seen that the taxation o f  miners was 
considerably reduced. The near total abolition o f  alcabala favored pri­
marily arrieros, traders and shopkeepers in the interior provinces. Last not 
least, while Indian peasants still carried a heavy burden with the contribu­
ción de indígenas, the per capita weight o f  this tax became lighter, both 
because the republican governm ents m aintained the same rate as the 
colonial regime in spite o f  inflation and because collection failed to keep 
up with population growth.
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The major loosers o f  the early republican tax reshuffle would seem to 
have been the lower and middle strata o f  the handful o f  im portant cen­
ters, primarily Lima, but probably also A requipa,Trujillo, Cuzco and Hua- 
manga. They paid m ost o f the im port duties, a good  share o f the new 
direct taxes (primarily patentes and predios urbanos) and were the major 
victims o f the practice o f  deficit spending. It is true that the cities, particu­
larly Lima, also were major beneficiaries o f  public expenditures, in the 
form  o f bureaucratic em ploym ent, as Santiago Tavara pointed out. But 
com pared to  the later colonial era, m ost iower and middle echelon 
bureaucrats clearly were living badly now. It seems m ore than coinciden­
tal that Lima’s population declined from the early 1820s at least until the 
early 1840s. In A requipa a keen observer as M ateo Paz Soldán could think 
as late as the mid-1850s that the town was declining, although in fact it 
was in the m idst o f  being transform ed into the en trepo t for all Southern 
Peru’s trade. Similar developm ents also characterized towns as Hua- 
manga and Cuzco. To be sure, factors related to regional and local econ­
omies may have played a major role in the decay o f  many o f Peru’s cities 
during the early republican period. But the governm ent’s fiscal policy 
clearly did no t favor urban lower and middle strata.
VI. C O N C L U D IN G  REMARKS
To conclude, I would like to  list the major findings presented in this pa­
per. I should stress that much o f  w hoat I said bears a tentative character 
and could only be verified through a major effort at quantification, which 
cannot be carried out on the basis o f published materials.
I. G ross revenues o f early republican Peru, after a quick recovery from  the 
Wars o f Independence, did not decline appreciably com pared w ith the 
level o f the late colonial period. 2. The decline o f  per capita revenues, par­
ticularly if m easured in constant terms, m ust be viewed as an expression 
o f  the weak econom ic base. 3. The efficiency o f  tax collection was not sig­
nificantly lower than during the late colonial period, at least as it concerns 
the old established ramos. 4. A lthough hesitatingly and with many rever­
sals, the tax policy o f  the early republican governm ents pursued political- 
economical goals in spite o f  fiscal exigencies. 5. These goals were directed 
at an econom ic recovery o f  the primary producing sectors as well as a sti­
m ulation o f  both dom estic and external trade. 6. The archaic structure o f 
society as well as the political pow er o f large landholders and o ther creole 
groups blocked the success o f the direct tax program . N evertheless, it
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was an im portant beginning, slowly gaining acceptation for taxes on net 
rent, on which governm ents after the end o f  the guano boom  could 
build. 7. Deficit spending became inevitable because after the late 1820s 
neither direct nor indirect taxes could be raised. It was the consequence 
o f  overspending due to lack o f budgetary control, fiscal decentralization 
and direct impact o f caudillo politics on governm ent finances. 8. The 
social distribution o f  taxes was not only regressive, but it was character­
ized by a bias against the urban lower and m iddle strata.
I would like to close with an assessm ent by General William Miller, made 
as early as 1829, which coincides w ith the m ajorpoin t raised in this paper: 
“The essential vice which m aybe im puted to the new governm ents, is not 
having been able to resist the convenience o f  borrow ing m oney; when 
instead o f  increasing their debts, they should have repaid those contract­
ed earlier. Regarding Peru, Chile and Buenos Aires, we can affirm w ith all 
confidence that if  their revenues had been adm inistered as they should, 
they would have been m ore than sufficient to cover all requirem ents.”“'
27 Retranslated from Miller (1975, II: 185).
